

Jihadi in Southeast Asia: A Comparative Deradicalisation Process between Indonesia and the Philippines

Rendy Wirawan¹

¹Department of International Relations, Universitas Mulawarman, Indonesia (corresponding email: rendy.wirawan@fisip.unmu.ac.id)

Submitted: date month year; accepted: (leave in blank)

ABSTRACT

Southeast Asia has been a fertile region for the homegrown terrorist groups and lone-wolf terrorists. Some are independently operated, while the others are affiliated with global terrorist network. With many attacks omnipresent in most of Southeast Asian countries, terrorist networks are gradually get revealed and members are arrested with various punishment even to death penalty. During detention, many terrorists, or jihadis, perform progressive development toward moderate understanding of Islam, while others remain unchanged. This article attempts to discover how some jihadis convert their orthodox belief and uncover their motivation to do so. To explore this inquiry, the article will specifically investigate two countries in Southeast Asia where terrorist groups are pervasive, they are Indonesia and the Philippines. The analysis will focus on deradicalisation process that these two countries have designed for their detained jihadis. At the end, we will find that deradicalisation works in Indonesia but not for the Philippines.

Keywords: terrorist, jihadi, deradicalisation, Indonesia, the Philippines.

INTRODUCTION

The long and fascinating history of al-Qaeda and Osama bin Laden spread out to the world, successfully making him as a reputable man. Even before 9/11 attack, many Muslims joined al-Qaeda to obtain military training so they can fight back against infidels and despotic government. Many Muslims viewed that Osama was successful in repelling Russia out of Afghanistan, so the group became the central paramilitary training for Muslims from other

countries. Not to mention Indonesia and the Philippines. Many Muslims fled to Afghanistan to receive military training and involve in practical situation of conflict and war. For Indonesia, Abdullah Sungkar and Abubakar Ba'asyir, leaders of *Jemaah Islamiyah*, was motivated to wage jihad against the vicious regime of Soeharto once they finished their training in Afghanistan back in 1980s (Solahudin, 2013, p. 134). However, things changed rapidly, and opportunities came timely. Those jihadis

diverted their objectives from overthrowing the regime into a very violent and long-lasting conflict and a massive terror attack in Indonesia.

Many jihadis, which we call as terrorists, exacerbate communal conflicts, like in Aceh and Poso, by taking role as combatants and paramilitary trainers for local Muslims as well as later becomes fugitive for terror attacks which sentence is a death penalty. Nonetheless, during the journey, many terrorists are being deradicalised and disengaged from such violent behaviour, converting their orientation from what Osama bin Laden and his predecessor *‘Ulama* (Clerics) had justified about extreme violent action. Unlike Indonesia, the Philippines possesses two different terrorist groups, Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) and Abu Sayyaf. The MILF was derived from the MNLF which was created back in the 70s as the result of Muslim-Christian riots in the southern part of the Philippines, while Abu Sayyaf was a creation of the global jihadi network which initially crafted through the very loosely organized Islamist bandits (Rogers, 2004, pp. 15-16; Banlaoi, 2006, p. 247).

There is an anomaly inside the terrorist group as we see that many of them committed to suicide bombings, fighting in the conflict area and designing a massive terror attack. Whereas few of them disengaged with terrorist activities and being deradicalised. Considering how successful al-Qaeda was in recruiting jihadi and how those jihadi engage in practical activities, it becomes imperative to investigate how some jihadi becomes deradicalised? What processes have they been experienced? To respond our key questions, this paper would analyse what factors, both pulling and pushing, influence the diversion of the thinking of those disengaged jihadi and examine to what extent these factors matter in changing the very basic of philosophical thought of each disengaged jihadi. In addition, it is critical to scrutinise the government capacity in designing and giving assistance to these processes. In response to

our discussion, this paper would look at two major violent conflicts in Southeast Asia that directly linked to global terrorist networks, the wide-range of Indonesia’s terrorism and the Philippines’ Mindanao conflict. This paper would only assess deradicalisation process which is experienced by key figures of terrorist groups as well as larger members who involved in local conflicts or riots, specifically to Umar Patek as a case which reflects how deradicalisation programme in Indonesia is exercised. Based on those two country’s case studies, this paper argues that jihadi in both countries are experiencing different kind of processes of deradicalisation, a significant success in Indonesia, but a fiasco in the Philippines. This condition leads to the initial hypothesis that the deradicalisation process in Southeast Asia is generally unpatterned, though we will find some similarities between those two cases.

RESEARCH METHOD

This research performs qualitative methods to describe the phenomenon through subjective interpretation. It is subjective by ontology because it depends on the data collected in specific case where researchers intervene the result through independent interpretation.

Although this research deploys subjective-qualitative analysis, the data and evidence collected in this article are entirely underpinned by secondary resources. These secondary resources comprise books, articles, reports, updates and even primary source such as interview manuscripts that have been collated into scholarly works.

RESULT AND ANALYSES

Umar Patek: Indonesia’s Success Story

The first case study this paper would explore is the process of deradicalisation in Indonesia, which this paper believes very progressive. Amrozi, Imam Samudra, Mukhlis, Ali Fauzi, Ali Imron and Umar Patek are among the key figures of jihadi in Indonesia. These jihadis experienced both

disengagement and deradicalisation, or counter-radicalisation, processes that enable themselves to transform into moderate Muslims. But at the end they choose different available options between deradicalised and remain unchanged. It is not impossible for jihadi to change their orientation and behaviour, although it is very hard and needs an extra effort (Sarwono, 2012, p 133). Disengagement for jihadi itself, according to John Horgan (2008, pp. 21-27), is divided into two primary modes: psychological and physical. However, disengaged does not always end in deradicalisation. Jihadis are expected to deradicalise once they have been isolated from their network. Therefore, the initial process is disengagement, then follows deradicalisation.

Many jihadis in Indonesia are experiencing disengagement through imprisonment that disables themselves to communicate with their outside network, forcing them to make contact with the government as the source of disengagement and deradicalisation process. During this process, Hikam (2016, p. 142-143) argues that the government is allowed to rehabilitate jihadi through systematic way, including to involve ex-jihadi to help detained jihadis to convert their orientation toward the more inclusive and non-violent religious understanding. The government could also introduce the national ideology of *Pancasila* as the collective values with the help of two major Muslim organisation like Muhammadiyah and Nahdhlatul Ulama to help them relieve their conservative view (Wirawan & Adhikatama, 2018). It enables jihadi to compare the new inclusive teachings with their previous belief and later make a self-reflection which mostly lead jihadi to the disillusionment over strategies and ideology of the group (Horgan, 2008, p. 21).

In addition to the conversion of orientation, the government in this process might also stop jihadi from scrutinising their misled behaviour, which is called as 'de-ideologisation' process (Golose, 2009, p. 65). Therefore, it is essential for the government to run a human-friendly treatment to jihadi in

order to cut their connection to the terrorist network and to supply them with inclusive values. More importantly, this strategy aims to obtain intelligence for counter-terrorism operations (Koehler, 2017, p. 95). In short, disengagement process in Indonesia covers Horgan's mode of both physical, through imprisonment, and psychological, through the preaching or *da'wah* to change jihadi's orientation as well as to stop them from continuously learning their extreme ideology. Both processes aim to disconnect jihadi with their terrorist network rather than entirely change their belief toward the more inclusive one. Level of success for this programme varies between individuals, and no research has concluded any specific factor that cause one's disengagement and one's continuing behaviour.

Since the result of disengagement programme varies from one another, the government also put a specific treatment on the individual basis. Those who are persistent with their violent behaviours such as Amrozi, Imam Samudra and Mukhlas will continue the disengagement process, while others like Ali Fauzi, Ali Imron and Umar Patek who have been disengaged will step on the next level of deradicalisation process. Ganor and Falk (2013, p. 125) argue that prison authorities might offer various rewards and sanctions at their disposal to convince jihadi to participate in the deradicalisation process. In return for their cooperative manner, they will be given many benefits including additional family visits and telephone calls. On the contrary, inmates who decided to refuse the offer will be penalised in many ways. This happens with our case of Umar Patek who has been arrested by the government together with Amrozi, Imam Samudra and Mukhlas. Umar Patek is a unique case where he, with Ali Imron, was the only jihadi converted his orientation among his many fellow jihadis involved in 2002 Bali bombing who were arrested by the Indonesian government and sentenced to death.

Umar Patek was the most hatred man as well as the most wanted person for the

2002 Bali bombing because of his involvement in the terrorist network as the bomb maker (Acharya, 2009, p. 1). However, his status as an inmate differs with his fellows due to his cooperative behaviour with the prison wardens and government authorities. During the disengagement process, Umar Patek showed changes in belief. However, these changes were not instant. Umar Patek probably had more moral sympathy for humanity than other fellows and could be one who saw the attack was inappropriate.

Solahudin (2013, pp. 186-188) shows that not all jihadi agrees to execute an attack plan outside conflict zone, only Imam Samudra and Mukhlas were in favour to do so. Umar Patek as one who supposedly opposes the proposal might be among the most resistant person in the group and therefore he could only use his skill in making bombs, because those who make bombs are moralist thugs (Jones 2012, p. 18).

The source of Umar Patek deviation is undeniably rooted back to revisionist's texts within a jihadi group, but it is also relevant to say that it is influenced by his wife. Gunaratna & Hennessy (2012, pp. 5-6) provide an interesting research of Umar Patek which articulate the mundane side of Umar Patek because he admits that sometimes he doubted to run terrorist action because of his wife rejection toward his intention, and so make him questioning 'whether jihad is more important than family?'. Find that Umar Patek has a strong affection for his wife, it triggers himself to rethink his pathway of jihad. Therefore, the evolving belief of Umar Patek must not be separated from his self-actualisation inspired by revisionists within al-Qaeda's affiliated group such as 'Atiyyatullah and Yahya al-Libi who expressed their displeasure to the group's ideology, methods and behaviour (Lahoud, 2012, p. 2).

In light of his search for true jihad, his communication with Ali Imron, another ex-Bali bombing jihadi, convince himself to follow the right path for jihad which is not as violent as what they have previously

believed. Umar Patek and Ali Imron might be the only two jihadis who oppose Bali bombing within their internal organisation (Tribun News, 2016). However, Ali Imron is very vocal to admit his mistakes and advocate other people who have been exposed to extremism through his reformist view of jihad which has to be only against the infidel's military and take place in a circumstance where Muslims are under serious threats. In detail he adds that to wage jihad, jihadi must considers principles and norms of jihad (Imron, 2007, pp. 212-224).

Indirectly, Ali Imron contributes to reshape Umar Patek's view of jihad and to convince him that the concept of jihad they believed at that time must be revisited in accordance to many *Sunnah* and *Qur'an* teachings. Those experiences, self-reflection toward revisionist's texts and Ali Imron's reformist view of jihad contribute to the exposure of Umar Patek to the moderate view of Salafi-jihadism movement as the prelude of his re-orientation journey long before he was detained. The doubt of orthodox jihadi belief is then spurred when he is in the prison and communicate positively with the broader prison's community.

The government must also serve as the pulling element in deradicalisation process by maintaining 'soft approach' strategies which are human-friendly in order to gain trust from jihadi and smoothly lead jihadi to the intended goals. It must be underlined that the participation of military through its hard approach is inappropriate and could lead to the reduction of effectiveness of deradicalisation process (Jones, 2012, p. 14; Gunaratna, 2017, p. 67). For Indonesia, the government, through many of its anti-terrorist infrastructures, fails to use hard approach but very successful in managing its soft approach to jihadi and later enables jihadi to behave constructively as a response to create a reciprocal connection between these two.

Gunaratna & Hennessy (2012, 6) interview Umar Patek about his experience in prison and found that authorities are very handful and supportive to him, even Patek

himself mentions that Colonel Zakariya, Inter-services intelligence, is like his grandfather. It shows how close relationship between Umar Patek and Col. Zakariya is and draw the very well treatment of authorities in prison. It is imperative for the government to use this approach to undermine the perception of jihadi that the government is un-Islamic as well as to encourage cooperation (Hwang et al., 2013, p. 773).

Umar Patek displays his cooperative behaviour to authorities even since he is being investigated and put on trial, and so the government sees that Umar Patek is able to run series of deradicalisation programmes (Arianti, 2012, p. 9). His positive response and cooperative attitude are rewarded a non-capital punishment, but a 20-year imprisonment. His deradicalisation process continues when he is jailed, where he makes constructive interaction with police officers, wardens and other authorities. One of the most significant event might be identified through the Umar Patek's transfer from Mako Brimob jail in Depok to Surabaya prison in Sidoarjo, which chief in Surabaya prison said that the objective of this transfer is to facilitate local police and anti-terror force to uncover East Java terrorist network (Faizal, 2014). In another prominent case, Umar Patek also offers help to the government to rescue Indonesians taken hostage by Abu Sayyaf group because he claims that he knows better how to communicate with them than anyone, although he would do this without any strings attached (Faizal, 2016).

This essay believes that jihadis are normal guys like us, neither a club of psychopath nor a bunch of people with the similar mental disorder. Nevertheless they do have a distinct belief to response the world compares to general Muslims (Sarwono, 2012, p. 131). Sarwono (2012, p. 135) held an experiment in 2009 when he conducted a workshop in Jakarta, Bandung, Semarang, Surabaya, Balikpapan and Ambon incorporated with few *ustadz* (religious teacher) to provide chaplaincy with moderate

Islamic view to 55 youths who were previously exposed to hard-line Islamic teachings. The result was astonishing, that all those men changed their preference toward Islamic teachings in 2012. This study indicates that jihadis are ordinary men and their ideology is convertible, even to those who had involved in various terrorist activities.

Ali Fauzi, Ali Imron and Umar Patek are among the very popular example of how jihadi transformed and now become 'ex'-jihadi. However, some might raise a question whether this programme runs well and meritorious because extreme jihadis are still omnipresent. Umar Patek is the reflection of how disengagement and deradicalisation process in Indonesia managed successfully. In fact, it is not solitary, there are Ali Imron and Ali Fauzi who also considered auspicious. Perhaps the most striking evidence is the willingness of Umar Patek to rise Indonesian flag in national independence day in 2017 (Allard, 2017) and confess that Indonesia itself was born under the grand jihad against *fasiq* or wicked group of imperial power (Christyaningsih, 2016).

As we discussed above, jihadi often rethinks their pathway during their involvement in terrorist group and later being disengaged and deradicalised while in prison by communicating with authorities and other inmates as well as learning a new model of Islam. After these two, it follows the support of new community where public becomes imperatives and government's social security is compulsive. Truth and reconciliation programme for Indonesian government might fits ex-jihadis who are ready to jump into the society by connecting deradicalised jihadi with victims or family of the victims. In Umar Patek case, Tony, a victim from 2003 J.W. Marriot bombing, is a close friend of him, helping Patek to socialise with public and engage to wider society once he is released (Khumaini, 2014). In line with this, exposure to victims or family of the victims might reinforce initial cognitive opening and nurture humanism within jihadi (Hwang et al., 2013, p. 770). Besides accelerating

assimilation process, it also helps society to eliminate resentment and adapt to ex-jihadi who are previously feared (Bakti, 2014, pp. 208-209).

Government strategy to deradicalise jihadi is not limited to the processes related to ideology or understanding of Islam and engagement to the community, but wider as to provide assistance for ex-jihadi to continue to maintain their life in the community, such as the economic and welfare aid. In Umar Patek case, we have very limited source mentioning this assistance. However, in another story such as Poso conflict where there were lots of civilian convert to jihadi and later deradicalised, the government provide abundant assistance to the community. In Poso, many Muslims, after disengaged from extremism, were trained for starting up business and many more aided with fresh money (Hwang et al., 2013, p. 775) to make sure that jihadis were able to maintain their life after the conflict (Bakti, 2014, p. 187). David McRae (2010, p. 410-412) explains how the government was very generous to pour money to ex-combatants in Poso as a reintegration programme so they would divert their attention to something more productive and it was proven by the absence of fatal conflict incidents in Poso for three years after the raids.

Having understood the particular case of Umar Patek, and Ali Imron in few contexts, and Poso conflict as the sample of our discussion, we could generate the underlying causes for jihadi to be deradicalised into two main factors, pushing and pulling. Changing personal priorities, exposure to revisionist texts and disillusionment from group's strategies and jihad concept are among the very principal pushing factors in changing terrorist's view of jihad. On the other hand, pulling factors such as familial pressure, relationship with individuals outside the terrorist circle, reconciliation with victims and their family and also economic assistance play quite significant in helping jihadi to find the new path and later to reshape their orientation. However, it must be well understood that all

of these factors work through a very systematic and comprehensive approach that involve many stakeholders and not merely a success story of a single agency such as National Anti-terrorism Agency or *BNPT* (IPAC, 2016, p. 16).

The Philippines' Unfit Strategies

The second case study is the Philippines terrorist groups which are Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) and Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG). Deradicalisation processes that jihadis in these two groups experience is different with Indonesia. First, Indonesian terrorist group was established clearly to spread terror and wage war against West as the derivative actions of al-Qaeda-sponsored 9/11 and second, by the organisation the group has strong hierarchical and clear division of tasks. It is not also part of any international terrorist group but as the network which operates independently. When it says 'network', it means that the group has no direct command relationship with al-Qaeda but only to provide required assistance when needed. In the Philippines, Collier (2006, p. 30) argues that MILF's organisation are blurred due to internal factional rivalries, while ASG is seen as an Islamist banditry with no vivid objectives and later recruited as ISIS division in Southeast Asia (Banlaoi, 2006, p. 247) with more radical agenda than one espoused by the MILF (Castro, 2010, p. 244).

The effort for Filipino government to run deradicalisation programme is far more difficult than Indonesian government because of the different nature of the jihadi groups. Abu Sayyaf affiliation to ISIS, the transformation group of al-Qaeda, exaggerates the condition because of its strength and back up from ISIS, added with the conquest of Marawi as the ISIS city and global jihadi training camp (Straffort Analysis, 2017). On the other side, MILF, with its factions, agrees to cooperate with the government in order to find a solution to end the conflict (Rogers, 2004, p. 16).

In many ways, the Filipino government recognises the importance of soft

approach but found it very complicated to implement in its deradicalisation programme and so come to use hard power as the ultimate way to counter terrorism in the Southern Philippines (Banlaoi, 2017, pp. 95-96). According to Banlaoi (2017), the government has designed several soft approaches to respond violence riot in the southern province such as 16-point of counter-terrorism programmes and human security act to mitigate radicalisation and to provide space for jihadi to recontextualise themselves. However, he argues that many of the programmes end with no victory and even produce larger violence conflict, such as Sala'am project which intended to end the conflict with negotiation. Above all, this essay argues that the Filipino government fails to promote such soft approach to deradicalise jihadi because the government deliberately invite military (see Banlaoi, 2017; see Castro, 2010, pp. 147-149) into many deradicalisation projects which either cause the malfunction of the programmes or the intensification of conflict into violence.

Another failure of the Filipino government in running deradicalisation strategy is the mismanagement of programmes. Banlaoi (2017, pp. 96) identifies that the government is generous enough to provide development programmes in the conflict area to reduce poverty, mitigate hunger and to provide social security and integration programs to jihadis. However, Banlaoi himself claims that those programmes are not deradicalisation programmes but the government effort to manufacture these issues as part of the grand strategy to deradicalise jihadi. On the other hand, compared to Indonesia where these sustainability programs are given after jihadi disengaged and ready to engage in wider society, in the Philippines, these programmes are executed simultaneously with the hard approach of the military, resulting to the less useful assistance and failure of trust gaining. In this case, the Filipino government seems to advocate forced participation to the jihadis. Although it is plausible, it has no evidence to show that this method has been so successful

(Horgan, 2014, p. 2), not even in Southeast Asia.

As we see that active jihadi in the Philippines experience very limited deradicalisation process, it also happens to jihadis who are detained by the government. Instead of running deradicalisation process in prison, detained jihadis are experiencing harsh treatment from the wardens and authorities (Banlaoi, 2017, p. 98). Whereas they are very convertible to non-violence since the Filipino jihadis engage to violent action were motivated by circumstantial reason rather than ideological conviction (Banlaoi, 2017, p. 98). However, from both active and detained jihadis, there is no prevalent evident that the Filipino government has converted one extremist jihadi to be disengaged and living moderately. Key figures like Isnilon Hapilon, Maute brothers, Janjalani, Sahiron, Hashim Salamat and Murad Ibrahim never declare themselves as deradicalised jihadis or pledge nationalism to the government, a very distinct phenomenon compared to Indonesia's Ali Imron and Umar Patek's reflective journey.

Perhaps the most effective process to deradicalise jihadis in the southern province is the proposal of the establishment of the Bangsamoro as an autonomous inclusive region, rather than an Islamic region by-law (LaVina, 2013). However, its ongoing process and uncertain environment put the deradicalisation process at stake. Woon (2011, pp. 290-291) identifies one of the splinter group in the southern Philippines conflict as his sample, the RPM, and found that its agreement to cease fire and commitment to non-violence is driven by the need of the group to obtain its ultimate objective of the autonomous region.

CONCLUSION

In conclusion, deradicalisation process in Southeast Asia varies and highly dependent on the individual government strategy to counter terrorism. Our Indonesian case study reflects that deradicalisation process should be run systematically and comprehensively, covering more on soft

approaches such as the treatment of government to jihadi and the following strategies after jihadi has been disengaged. This design is also adopted by other Southeast Asian countries such as Malaysia and Singapore (see Rabasa et al., 2010, pp. 95-106) where jihadis in those countries are well treated with the soft approach and the role of government remains significant, although not solitary. While in the Philippines, the process suffers lack of soft approach but tend to use hard power and military involvement.

Notwithstanding, the role of individual jihadi is deterministic, whether they agree by themselves to scrutinise reformist view or not. Here, Umar Patek and Ali Imron have successfully deal with this, but not to the Filipino key jihadis. However, in general, we could not find a pattern of these two case studies and conclude that deradicalisation strategies in Southeast Asia are non-generalised. The process should be formularised similarly, which is through soft approach, but seeing what the Philippines have done is something bizarre, deviated from the generic 'rules' used by other Southeast Asian countries. Therefore, Malaysia, Singapore and Indonesia relatively successful to deradicalise jihadi, but not with the Philippines.

REFERENCES

- Acharya, A. (2009). *Targeting terrorist financing: international cooperation and new regimes*, Routledge, London.
- Allard, T. (2017). 'Reformed ex-militants in Indonesia mark independence day', *Reuters*, accessed in March 28, retrieved from <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-indonesia-independenceday-militants/reformed-ex-militants-in-indonesia-mark-independence-day-idUSKCN1AX0UB>.
- Arianti, V. (2012). 'Implications of Umar Patek's conviction', *Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses*, 4(8), 7-9.
- Bakti, A.S. (2014). *Darurat terorisme: kebijakan pencegahan, perlindungan dan deradikalisasi*, Daulat Press, Jakarta.
- Bankoff, G. (2003), 'Regions of risk: Western discourses on terrorism and the significance of Islam', *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, 26, 413-428.
- Banlaoi, R.C. (2006). 'The Abu Sayyaf Group: from mere banditry to genuine terrorism', *Southeast Asian Affairs*, 247-262.
- Banlaoi, R.C. (2017). 'Counter-terrorism measures and de-radicalization efforts in Southeast Asia: a view from the Philippines', in H. Glaser (ed.), *Talking to the enemy: deradicalization and disengagement of terrorists*, Nomos, Baden-Baden, 91-104.
- Castro, R.C. (2010). 'Abstract of counter-insurgency in the Philippines and the Global War on Terror: examining the dynamics of the twenty-first century long wars', *European Journal of East Asian Studies*, 9(1), 135-160.
- Christyaningsih (2016). 'Ini strategi Umar Patek bebaskan WNI yang disandera Abu Sayyaf', *Republika*, accessed in March 26, retrieved from <http://nasional.republika.co.id/berita/nasional/umum/16/04/25/o66uoy354-ini-strategi-umar-patek-bebaskan-wni-yang-disandera-abu-sayyaf>.
- Collier, K. (2006). 'Terrorism: evolving regional alliances and state of failure in Mindanao', *Southeast Asian Affairs*, 26-38.
- Cook, D. (2015). *Understanding jihad*, University of California Press, California.
- Faizal, A. (2014). 'Mengapa Umar Patek dipindah ke lapas Porong?', *Kompas*, accessed in March 26, retrieved from <https://regional.kompas.com/read/2014/03/14/1350007/Mengapa.Umar.Patek.Dipindah.ke.Lapas.Porong>.
- Faizal, E.B. (2016). 'Convicted terrorist Umar Patek wants to help in hostage negotiation', *Jakarta Post*, accessed in March 26, retrieved from

- <http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2016/04/08/convicted-terrorist-umar-patek-wants-to-help-in-hostage-negotiations.html>.
- Ganor, B. & Falk, O. (2013). 'De-radicalization in Israel's prison system', *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, 36(2), 116-131.
- Golose, P.R. (2009). *Deradikalisasi terorisme: humanis, soul approach dan menyentuh akar rumput*, YPKIK, Jakarta.
- Gunaratna, R. & Hennessy, O. (2012). 'Understanding the radical mindset factors motivating terrorism and political violence', *Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses*, 4(9), 2-7.
- Gunaratna, R. (2017). 'Fighting terrorism with smart power: the role of community engagement and terrorist rehabilitation', in H. Glaser (ed.), *Talking to the enemy: deradicalization and disengagement of terrorists*, Nomos, Baden-Baden, 67-89.
- Hikam, M. (2016). *Deradikalisasi: peran masyarakat sipil Indonesia membendung radikalisme*, Penerbit Kompas, Jakarta.
- Hoffman, B. (2006). *Inside terrorism*, rev. edition, Columbia University Press, New York.
- Horgan, J. (2008). 'Individual disengagement: a psychological analysis', in T. Bjørge & J. Horgan (eds.), *Leaving terrorism behind: individual and collective disengagement*, Routledge, New York, 17-29.
- Horgan, J. (2014). 'What makes a terrorist stop being a terrorist?', *Journal for Deradicalization*, 15(1), 1-4.
- Hwang, C. et al. (2013). 'The disengagement of jihadis in Poso, Indonesia', *Asian Survey*, 53(4), 754-777.
- Idris, I. (2017). *Membumikan deradikalisasi: soft approach model pembinaan terorisme dari hulu ke hilir secara berkesinambungan*, Daulat Press, Jakarta.
- Imron, A. (2007). *Ali Imron sang pengebom*, Penerbit Republika, Jakarta.
- International Crisis Group (2007). "Deradicalisation" and Indonesian prisons', *Asia Report*, 142.
- IPAC (2016). 'Update on Indonesian pro-ISIS prisoners and deradicalisation efforts', *IPAC Report*, 34.
- Jones, S. (201). 'TNI and counter-terrorism: not a good mix', *Strategic Review*, 2(1), 14-18.
- Khumaini, A. (2014). 'Kisah persahabatan Umar Patek dengan korban bom hotel JW Marriot, accessed in March 31, retrieved from <https://www.merdeka.com/peristiwa/kisah-persahabatan-umar-patek-dengan-korban-bom-hotel-jw-marriot.html>.
- Koehler, D. (2017). *Understanding deradicalization: methods, tools and programs for countering violent extremism*, Routledge, Abingdon.
- Lahoud, N. et al. (2012). *Letters from Abbottabad: Bid Laden sidelined?*, The Combatting Terrorism Center, West Point.
- LaVina, A. (2013). 'The creation of Bangsamoro: issues, challenges and solutions', *Philippine Law and Society Review*, 3, 3-41.
- McRae, D. (2010). 'Reintegration and localized conflict: security impacts beyond influencing spoilers', *Conflict, Security & Development*, 10(3), 403-430.
- Rabasa, A. et al. (2010). *Deradicalizing Islamist extremists*, RAND Corporation, California.
- Rogers, S. 2004, 'Beyond the Abu Sayyaf: the lessons of failure in the Philippines', *Foreign Affairs*, 83(1), 15-20.
- Sarwono, S.W. (2012). *Terorisme di Indonesia dalam tinjauan psikologi*, Alvabet, Tangerang
- Solahudin, (2013). *The roots of terrorism in Indonesia*, UNSW Press, Sydney.
- Straftor Analysis (2017). 'In the Philippines, the Islamic State fights to set the narrative', 1.

-
- Tribunnews, (2016). 'Curhatan hati Ali Imron dan Umar Patek memaknai jihad yang sebenarnya', *Tribunnews*, accessed in March 26, retrieved from <http://www.tribunnews.com/nasional/2016/04/26/curahan-hati-ali-imron-dan-umar-patek-memaknai-jihad-yang-sebenarnya>.
- UN Counter-terrorism Implementation Task Force (2008). *First report of the working group on radicalization and extremism that lead to terrorism: inventory state programmes*, Turin.
- Wirawan, R. & Adhikatama (2018). 'Contesting ISIS in Indonesia: leadership and ideological barriers on radicalism as foundation to counterterrorism', *Social Sciences*, 7(2), 55-62.
- Woon, C.Y. (2011). 'Undoing violence, undoing precarity: beyond the frames of terror in the Philippines', *Geoforum*, 42, 285-296.